Dynamic multilateral markets by Polanski, Arnold & Lazarova, Emiliya
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Dynamic Multilateral Markets
Proof of Theorem 1
Arnold Polanski · Emiliya Lazarova
the date of receipt and acceptance should be inserted later
Theorem 1 There exists a unique SE payoff profile in any multilateral bargaining game.
Lemma 1 For any n× n matrix A and diagonal n× n matrices Dα and Dδ with positive determinants, let
Σ = D
1/2
α D
1/2
δ AD
1/2
α D
1/2
δ . Then,
1.1 λ(DαADδ) = λ(Σ) and
1.2 λ(Dδ −DαADδ) = λ(Dδ −Σ),
where λ(M) denotes an eigenvalue of the matrix M .
Proof 1 Proof: Let z˜ = (D1/2α D−1/2δ )z for an eigenvector z.
1) Σ = D1/2α D
1/2
δ AD
1/2
α D
1/2
δ = (D
−1/2
α D
1/2
δ )(DαADδ)(D
1/2
α D
−1/2
δ )⇒
(D−1/2α D
1/2
δ )(DαADδ)(D
1/2
α D
−1/2
δ )z = λz⇒ (DαADδ)z˜ = λz˜.
2) Dδ −Σ = Dδ − (D−1/2α D1/2δ )(DαADδ)(D1/2α D−1/2δ )⇒
Dδz− (D−1/2α D1/2δ )(DαADδ)(D1/2α D−1/2δ )z = λz⇒ Dδz˜− (DαADδ)z˜ = λz˜.
Lemma 2 The system,
xi = δixi +
∑
S∈Si
θSpiS
αi
α(S)
(
v(S)−
∑
i∈S
δixi
)
, ∀i ∈ N , (1)
has a unique solution x(θ) for any vector of agreement probabilities θ = (θS)S⊆N . This solution is contin-
uous in θ.
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Proof 2 Let Ic = 1 if c is true and Ic = 0 otherwise and define f as:
fi(x) = δixi +
∑
S∈Si
θSpiS
αi
α(S)
(v(S)−
∑
i∈S
δixi) = Φx+ φ, (2)
Φ = (I −DαΠ)Dδ, I,Dα, Dδ, Π ∈ RN×N+ , φ ∈ RN+ ,
I = Ii=j , (Dα)ij = Ii=jαi, (Dδ)ij = Ii=jδi, φi = αi
∑
S∈Si
γSv(S),
Πij =
∑
S∈Si∩Sj
γS , γS = θSpiS/α(S) ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ N ,
Hence, Dα and Dδ are diagonal matrices and Π is a non-negative symmetric matrix with all real eigenval-
ues.
First, we prove that all eigenvalues of Φ lie in the interval [−δ̂, δ̂], where δ̂ = maxi δi < 1. We note that
the eigenvalues of DαΠDδ are bounded from above by δ̂,
∀j ∈ N ,
∑N
i=1
(DαΠDδ)ij =
∑N
i=1
αiδj
∑
S∈Si∩Sj
γS
≤ δj
∑N
i=1
αi
∑
S∈Si∩Sj
piS
α(S)
= δj
∑
S∈Sj
piS ≤ δj
⇒ λmax(DαΠDδ) ≤ ||DαΠDδ||1 ≤ δ̂.
In order to show the lower bound on the eigenvalues of DαΠDδ , we note that Π is positive semidefinite,
∀z ∈ RN , zTΠz =
∑
S⊆N
γS
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
zizj
 = ∑
S⊆N
γS
(∑
i∈S
zi
)2
≥ 0,
which implies that all eigenvalues of Π are nonnegative. As Π is symmetric, it can be diagonalized, i.e.
Π = PΛPT , where the diagonal matrix Λ contains the nonnegative eigenvalues of Π . Let
Σ := D
1/2
δ D
1/2
α ΠD
1/2
α D
1/2
δ = (D
1/2
δ D
1/2
α P )Λ(D
1/2
δ D
1/2
α P )
T .
By Sylvester’s law of inertia, the number of negative eigenvalues is the same for the symmetric matrixΣ and
for Λ. As the latter diagonal matrix has only nonnegative entries, the same must hold for the former. On the
other hand,Σ has the same eigenvalues asDαΠDδ by Lemma 1.1. Hence, we conclude that all eigenvalues
of DαΠDδ and of Σ lie between 0 and δ̂.
Then, applying Weyl’s inequality to the symmetric matrix Dδ −Σ, we obtain the bounds,
λmin(Dδ −Σ) ≥ λmin(Dδ) + λmin(−Σ) > −δ̂ > −1,
λmax(Dδ −Σ) ≤ λmax(Dδ) + λmax(−Σ) ≤ δ̂ < 1.
By Lemma 1.2, Dδ − Σ and Φ = Dδ − DαΠxDδ have the same set of eigenvalues, which proves that
all eigenvalues of Φ are less than one in modulus. By the Contraction Mapping Theorem and Lemma 2.1 in
Bramoulle (2001), it follows that (1) has a unique solution x(θ) ∈ RN , i.e., the solution to (1) is nonsingular.
As (1) is a linear system, xi(θ) is given by the Cramer’s rule as the ratio of two determinants that are
continuous functions of θ (with non-vanishing denominator for all θ). Therefore, x(θ) is continuous in θ.
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Lemma 3 A SE x is continuous in v(S) for any coalition S ∈ Θ = {S ⊆ N : v(S) ≥ 0}.
Proof 3 In what follows, we omit the discount factors δ1, ..., δN in all references to SE. We define the vectors,
v = (v(T ))T∈Θ, v˜ = (v(T )T∈Θ\S , v˜(S)), v̂ = (v(T )T∈Θ\S , v̂(S)).
Let xv(θ) ∈ RN be the unique (by Lemma 2) solution to (1) for the vector of coalitional values v and
agreement probabilities θ = (θT )T∈Θ.
Let θ(xv) = (θT (xv))T∈Θ, where θT (xv) = 1 if v(T ) >
∑
i∈T δix
v
i and, conversely, θT (x
v) = 0 if
(v(T ) ≤∑i∈T δixvi ).
In what follows, we show that the SE xv˜ converges to the SE xv = xv(θ(xv)) when v˜ approaches v.
If v(T ) 6=∑i∈T δixvi for all T ∈ Θ, then, due to the continuity of xv˜(θ) in v˜(S), it holds for sufficiently
small |v˜(S)− v(S)| that,∑
i∈T
δix
v˜
i (θ(x
v)) ≈
∑
i∈T
δix
v
i > v(T )⇒
∑
i∈T
δix
v˜
i (θ(x
v)) > v(T ),∑
i∈T
δix
v˜
i (θ(x
v)) ≈
∑
i∈T
δix
v
i < v(T )⇒
∑
i∈T
δix
v˜
i (θ(x
v)) < v(T ).
As xv is a SE, then xv˜(θ(xv)) is also a SE and
xv˜(θ(xv))→ xv(θ(xv)) = xv when v˜(S)→ v(S).
Consider now the case ∆(v) := {T ∈ Θ : ∑i∈T δixvi = v(T )} 6= ∅. In other words, there is at least one
coalition that is indifferent between agreement and disagreement in the SE xv. Take v˜(S) > v(S) such that
for all v̂(S) ∈ {(v(S), v˜(S)} we have that ∆(v̂) = ∅. Such v˜(S) exists as there is only a finite number of
values v̂(S) for which ∆(v̂) 6= ∅. The proof of the last claim is similar to that of Lemma 1 in A Appendix in
the main text and is omitted.
Then, by the same argument as in the SE existence proof, we can find a fixed point θ˜ ∈ ϕ∆(v)(θ˜) in the
game with values v˜, where θ˜S = θS(xv) for all S ∈ Θ\∆(v) and ϕ∆(v) is defined in (4). Then,
v˜(S)→ v(S)⇒ xv˜(θ˜)→ xv(θ˜) = xv(θ(xv)) = xv,
where the last but one equality follows because θ˜T = θT (xv) for all T ∈ Θ\∆(v) and for all T ∈ ∆(v),∑
i∈T
δix
v
i = v(T )⇒ θT (xv)(
∑
i∈T
δix
v
i − v(T )) = θ˜T (
∑
i∈T
δix
v
i − v(T )).
Moreover, as xv = xv(θ˜) is a SE, then for all T ∈ Θ\∆(v),∑
i∈T
δix
v˜
i (θ˜) ≈
∑
i∈T
δix
v
i (θ˜) > v(T )⇒
∑
i∈T
δix
v˜
i (θ˜) > v(T ) & θT = θ˜T = 0,∑
i∈T
δix
v˜
i (θ˜) ≈
∑
i∈T
δix
v
i (θ˜) < v(T )⇒
∑
i∈T
δix
v˜
i (θ˜) < v(T ) & θT = θ˜T = 1.
Hence, xv˜(θ˜) is an SE. 
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Proof 4 Theorem 1:
Existence: Let Θ = {S ⊆ N : v(S) > 0} be the set of productive coalitions and define the system of
linear equations,
zi = δizi +
∑
S∈Si
θSpiS
αi
α(S)
(v(S)−
∑
i∈S
δizi), ∀i ∈ N . (3)
By Lemma 2, there is a unique solution z(θ) to (3) for any θ ∈ [0, 1]#Θ that is continuous in θ. For a set of
coalitions ∆ ⊆ Θ, define the correspondence ϕ∆(θ) : [0, 1]#Θ ⇒ [0, 1]#Θ as follows,
∀S ∈ ∆, ϕ∆(θ)S
 = 1 if
∑
i∈S δizi(θ) < v(S),
∈ [0, 1] if ∑i∈S δizi(θ) = v(S),
= 0 if
∑
i∈S δizi(θ) > v(S),
(4)
∀S ∈ Θ\∆, ϕ∆(θ)S = θS .
By definition, this correspondence has a closed graph and convex and non-empty images (i.e., ∀θ ∈ [0, 1]#Θ, ϕ(θ)
is a nonempty and convex subset of [0, 1]#Θ). Then, by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, there exists some θ˜
such that θ˜ ∈ ϕ∆(θ˜). By setting ∆ = Θ, we obtain that z(θ˜) is a SE,
(1− δi)zi(θ˜) =
∑
S∈Si
θ˜piS
αi
α(S)
(v(S)−
∑
i∈S δizi(θ˜))
=
∑
S∈Si
piS
αi
α(S)
max(v(S)−
∑
i∈S δizi(θ˜), 0), ∀i ∈ N .
Uniqueness: Let the set Θ = {S ⊆ N : v(S) > 0} of productive coalitions be non-empty and, for the
sake of contradiction, assume that there are two SE, x and z, x 6= z, with the respective sets of agreeing
coalitions Sx ⊆ Θ and Sz ⊆ Θ,
Sx = {C ∈ Θ : θC = 1(0)⇔ v(C) >
∑
i∈C
δixi (v(C) ≤
∑
i∈C
δixi)},
Sz = {C ∈ Θ : θC = 1(0)⇔ v(C) >
∑
i∈C
δizi (v(C) ≤
∑
i∈C
δizi)}.
Note that the cardinalities #Sx and #Sz must be at least one and that Sx 6= Sz as, otherwise, Lemma
2 implies x = z. Take a coalition C ∈ Sx \ Sz (or C ∈ Sz \ Sx). By our existence results, for each
value v˜(C) ∈ [0, v(C)], there is a SE xv˜. Due to the continuity of xv˜ in v˜(C) (Lemma 3) and the fact that
0 ≤∑i∈C δixi < v(C) (as C ∈ Sx), there is a value v˜(C) < v(C) such that∑i∈C δixv˜i = v˜(C). Hence,
if we set θC(xv˜) = 0, xv˜ will be a SE. Then, we can remove C fromΘ, i.e., set v(C) = 0, without destroying
the SE xv˜. On the other hand, the SE z does not change after removing C because C /∈ Sz,∑
i∈C
δiz
v˜
i =
∑
i∈C
δizi ≥ v(C) > v˜(C).
Thus, we have two different SE, xv˜ and zv˜ = z 6= xv˜ in the game with #Θ−1 productive coalitions. We can
keep removing productive coalitions one by one fromΘ but keep their matching probabilities unchanged until
either the set of agreeing coalitions is the same for the two different SE or the set of agreeing coalitions is
empty for one (and only one) of the SE. The former case contradicts Lemma 2 while the latter is incompatible
with #Θ ≥ 1, i.e., with the existence of productive coalitions. 
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